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Labor Market Developments in China: A Neoclassical View
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This paper assesses the applicability of two alternative theories in understanding labor 
market developments in China: the classical view featuring a Lewis turning point in wage 
growth versus a neoclassical framework emphasizing rational choices of individuals and 
equilibrating forces of the market. Empirical evidence based on multiple data sources fails to 
validate the arrival of the Lewis turning point in China, showing continuous and coordinated 
wage growth across rural and urban sectors instead. Consistent with the neoclassical view, 
we find that rural workers expanded off-farm work when mobility restrictions were lifted, 
interprovincial migration responded to expected earnings and local employment conditions, 
and returns to education converged gradually to the international standard. These findings 
suggest major progresses in the integration of labor markets in China. 
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In the past two decades, China￿ s emergence as the global manufacturing center has relied
largely on its abundant human resources. However, since 2004, China began to experience
periods of labor shortages in the Pearl River Delta and Yangtze River Delta regions because
employers were reported to have had di¢ culties in recruiting migrant labor (Huang, 2004).
Thereafter anxiety over rising wages in China has been widespread. Among other studies, Cai
and Wang (2010) and Cai and Du (2010) document that, after a long period of stagnation,
wages of unskilled labor in China rose rapidly in the early years of the new century. They
take wage growth as an indication of the Lewis turning point, where rural surplus labor is
depleted, thus pushing up wages. Using village survey data from several provinces, Zhang
et al. (2010) draw a similar conclusion.1
The notion that China is quickly approaching or has already reached the Lewis turning
point is not without controversy. An opposing view stresses the fact that China still has a
considerable pool of surplus labor in the rural sector (Knight et al., 2010; Minami and Xin,
2008). However, to date, only limited attempts have been made to examine the patterns of
wage growth across rural and urban sectors as implied by the classical theory of the turning
point. Fundamentally, there is still an open question about the usefulness of the Lewisian
model for understanding the evolution of Chinese labor markets in the past three decades.
In a seminal paper, Lewis (1954) proposed a theory of economic development featuring
the dualistic structure of a traditional (agricultural) and a modern (industrial) sector. In the
initial phase of development, there is abundance of labor in the agricultural sector, where an
institutional wage is set above the marginal product of labor. Industrialization can be sup-
ported cheaply during this phase because the industrial sector faces unlimited labor supply
at a low, ￿xed real wage. With continued industrialization, the economy reaches a Lewis
turning point once the rural surplus labor is depleted. From this point, the industry faces an
upward-sloping labor supply curve, which implies sharp increases in real wage with further
growth. This classic view of economic development provided important insight for under-
standing the transformation of a dual economy and was in￿ uential in the history of economic
thought. However, in the 1960s, an alternative neoclassical theory of development emerged,
1Anxiety over rising labor costs has also attracted attention from the media and Chinese government
research institutions. The Economist (January 11, 2007) notes that pay for factory workers has been rising
at ￿double-digit rates for several years.￿ The New York Times (August 29, 2007) pro￿les a number of
factory managers having di¢ culty ￿nding workers and dealing with wage rises. In a 2007 survey covering
2749 villages, the Development Research Center of the State Council found that three-quarters of the villages
no longer had suitable young labor to transfer out of agriculture. In its 2007 Green Book on Population
and Labor, The Institute of Population and Labor Economics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
(CASS) also implied that China was around the Lewis turning point. Both of these studies forecast severe
labor shortages and an acceleration of wage rises in China starting as early as 2009 or 2010.
1and it has been adopted widely in the study of development issues. This neoclassical theory,
as exempli￿ed in the work of Schultz (1964), emphasizes the rational choices of individuals
and families in decision making. Contrary to the classical view, wages are determined by
equilibrating forces of the markets rather than being set institutionally. Therefore, labor is
never available to the industrial sector without sacri￿cing agricultural output. The real wage
in the industrial sector rises steadily over time, and a distinctive turning point never exists.
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the applicability of the two alternative theories
in understanding labor market development in China: the classical view featuring a Lewis
turning point in wage growth versus a neoclassical framework emphasizing rational choices
of individuals and equilibrating forces of the market. We ￿rst lay out a simple and compa-
rable version of the classical and neoclassical theories of economic development and derive
a set of contrasting yet testable implications. Multiple sources of data are deployed to test
empirically the predictions of the models. In particular, we are able to construct and exam-
ine the changing wage levels over time for agricultural workers, rural o⁄-farm employment,
rural migrants, and urban unskilled workers, drawing aggregate data from the Statistical
Yearbooks of China (SYC) and individual information from the Urban Household Surveys
(UHS) and China Health and Nutrition Surveys (CHNS).
We ￿nd that while migrant wages have increased in recent years, they are an integral
component of overall wage growth that has occurred continuously in the past two decades.
Empirical evidence from multiple data sources fails to support the arrival of the Lewis turning
point in China, showing coordinated wage growth across rural and urban sectors instead.
Consistent with the neoclassical view, we ￿nd that rural workers expanded o⁄-farm work
during the reform process, interprovincial migration responded to expected earnings and
local employment opportunities, and rates of return to education have increased signi￿cantly
in both rural and urban labor markets in recent years, converging steadily to the level of
international norm. These ￿ndings suggest that major progresses have been made towards
the integration of labor markets in China.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the classical and
neoclassical views of economic development and derives a set of testable implications from
the two theories. Section 3 provides an overview of the dual economy and labor market
institutions in China and uses several sources of aggregate and household data to examine
empirically the implications of the alternative frameworks. Section 4 presents the concluding
remarks.
22 Alternative Views of Economic Development
T.W. Schultz and Arthur Lewis were awarded the 1979 Nobel prize for their pioneering
research on economic development. While Lewis originally proposed the classical theory,
Schultz was a pioneer who helped lay out the foundations of the neoclassical development
theory. Other economists, such as Ranis and Fei (1961) and Jorgenson (1967), also made
major contributions. In this section, we present a simple version of the classical and neo-
classical models with comparable settings to highlight the main mechanisms of development
and derive a set of contrasting yet testable implications from the alternative models.
2.1 The Classical Lewis Model
Lewis (1954) divides a typical developing economy into two sectors: a traditional (agricul-
ture) sector and a modern (industrial) sector. He uses a two-sector model to study the
expansion of the modern sector, which absorbs cheap labor from the traditional sector. In
the traditional sector, population size is large compared with land; therefore, the marginal
productivity of labor is close to zero. As the modern sector continues to expand, rural surplus
labor will eventually disappear, pushing up wages. This transition from ￿unlimited supply
of labor￿to labor shortage is known as the Lewis turning point.
In what follows, we describe the Lewis model in detail. The conceptual framework
follows closely that of Ranis and Fei (1961). For simplicity, we consider an economy with no
technological progress or population growth.2
The Agricultural Sector
Consider an economy where all production takes place in the agricultural sector. The output
of the agricultural sector is a constant-returns-to-scale function of labor and land. Suppose
that there is no capital investment in the agricultural sector and that land is ￿xed in supply.
Let Y A
t be the agricultural output, Xt the ￿xed quantity of land, and LA
t the agricultural








where 1 ￿ ￿ is the elasticity of output with respect to labor. The supply of land is ￿xed;






The economy under consideration is labor abundant and resource scarce. By assumption,
if agricultural labor input is above L; additional labor input does not produce more output.
In other words, total population P is the sum of the maximum agricultural labor force
L employed at positive marginal productivity and redundant labor R with zero marginal
2The model can be extended to consider technological progress and population growth in both sectors.
However, the basic implications remain very similar.
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t ￿ P
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￿￿￿ if 0 ￿ LA
t < L
0 if L ￿ LA
t ￿ P
:
At the initial point (t = 0); let the entire population be devoted to agricultural produc-
tion, producing a total agricultural output of Y ￿ = L
1￿￿
: Ranis and Fei (1961) assumes that
total agricultural output is consumed by the total labor force P: The real wage is set to the
average product of labor. This wage, measured in agricultural goods, is called institutional







The key assumption is that ￿this wage is based on some institutional sharing arrangement
rather than on the marginal productivity calculus￿(Ranis, 1988). If the market is competi-
tive, real wage will be equal to the marginal productivity of labor and fall to zero.
Let D be the point at which the marginal product of labor equals the institutional wage;
therefore,




Among the total agricultural labor force P, P ￿L are redundant workers because they have
zero marginal product, and P ￿ D are disguised unemployed workers because the marginal
product of labor is below the institutional wage.
The Industrial Sector
The industrial sector also has a constant-returns-to-scale production technology. Denote Y M
t
as the industrial output, LM
t the industrial labor input, and K the quantity of capital: The












3We assume that L > P(1￿￿) holds such that the institutional wage is greater than the marginal product
of labor when agricultural labor force is equal to L:
4In the industrial sector, wage equals the marginal product of labor, which is determined by:
MPL
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The industrial sector di⁄ers from the agricultural sector in two aspects. First, there
is capital investment in the industry, and capital is a key input. Second, labor market is
competitive in the modern sector.
Phases of Development and the Lewis Turning Point
In the ￿rst phase of economic development, redundant labor in the agricultural sector is
available to the industrial sector at a ￿xed real wage, w￿; measured in agricultural goods.
The marginal product of labor equals zero in the agricultural sector at this stage. Therefore,
reallocation of labor to the industrial sector has no e⁄ect on agricultural output. As long as
there exists redundant labor in the agricultural sector, the industrial sector faces a perfect
elastic labor supply curve at the ￿xed real wage measured in manufacturing goods. During
this phase, industrial employment can grow up to P ￿ L; the size of redundant labor in the
agricultural sector, and the real wage stays ￿xed over time. Ranis and Fei de￿ne the ￿Lewis
turning-point￿as the threshold point at which redundant rural labor disappears.
The second stage of economic development refers to the period when agricultural redun-
dant labor has depleted, but the marginal productivity of labor in the agricultural sector
is still below the institutional wage. Just like in the ￿rst phase, the industrial sector only
needs to pay the institutional wage w￿ (measured in agricultural goods) to attract agricul-
tural labor. However, when labor moves out of the agricultural sector, agricultural output
declines because of the positive marginal product of labor. Suppose the demand for agri-
cultural goods is ￿xed, falling agricultural output would drive up the price of agricultural
goods.4 The institutional wage measured in industrial goods increases as the terms of trade
turns against manufacturing. In the second phase of development, industrial employment
continues to grow until it reaches P ￿D; the size of disguised unemployment. The real wage,
measured in industrial goods, starts growing due to the worsening of the terms of trade for
the industrial sector.
The third phase of economic development arrives when the transfer of disguised unem-
ployed labor from the agricultural sector is completed. From that time on, real wage will be
determined by the marginal productivity of labor in the agricultural sector, and the indus-
trial and agricultural sectors will compete for the scarce labor. The industrial sector then
faces an upward-sloping labor supply curve. The real wage will start to grow fast for two
4This assumption is made by Ranis and Fei (1961).
5reasons: (1) the terms of trade for the industrial sector continues to deteriorate, and (2) the
agricultural real wage determined by marginal productivity continues to increase.
2.2 The Neoclassical Model of Development
The neoclassical model of economic development assumes positive labor productivity in
the agricultural sector so that labor is never redundant. The real wage in the agricultural
sector changes with the evolving conditions of development. In Jorgenson (1967)￿ s version
of neoclassical development model, wage rate in the agricultural sector is assumed to be
proportional to that in the industrial sector. Another crucial contrast to the classical model
is that the growth of an agricultural surplus determines the rate of growth of industrial
employment.
In the Jorgenson model, the agricultural production technology is similar to that in the







￿1￿￿ ; where ￿ is the constant growth rate of technological
progress, and all the other variables and parameters have the same interpretation as in the
Lewis model. The supply of land is assumed to be ￿xed, and this production function may

























Initially, all economic activities take place in the agricultural sector. Therefore, LA
t = P;
where P is the total population.














where ￿ is a constant growth rate of technological progress, and all the other variables and
parameters are the same as the classical model. The neoclassical model also assumes a
critical value of agricultural output per person, y+, above which all additional consumption
is devoted to manufactured goods. Therefore, agricultural output per person (yA
t ) in excess





If agricultural output per person is below the critical value, the entire labor force works in
the agricultural sector. Once yA
t exceeds y+, part of the labor force may be released from
agriculture to produce manufactured goods. Therefore, given positive initial capital stock, a
growing agricultural surplus leads to an expansion of the industrial labor force and sustained
growth in the economy.
Agricultural workers are willing to move to the industrial sector if industrial wages are
greater than agriculture income. Jorgenson (1967) assumes that the wage di⁄erential nec-
essary to attract agricultural labor into the industrial sector is roughly proportional to the
industrial wage rate. Let ￿ ￿ 1 denote the ratio between agricultural income and industrial
wage. In a ￿perfect￿neoclassical theory without market frictions, wage rates in the two sec-
tors must be equal. As such, the proportionality ￿ = 1: If the industrial sector compensates
agricultural workers for migration cost and higher cost of living in cities, ￿ would be below
unity.
2.3 Implications on Wage Growth
The classical Lewis model characterizes rural labor markets as uncompetitive in the early
stage of development. Rural wages are assumed to be institutionally determined at levels
above the market equilibrium of zero marginal product of labor. Real wages in the agricul-
tural and industrial sectors are stagnant initially.5 The turning point marks the end of wage
stagnation in the industrial sector and signals the beginning of large wage increases. After
the turning point, the industrial sector faces an upward-sloping labor supply curve.6
In contrast, the neoclassical model characterizes rural labor markets in developing economies
as competitive. Rural wages re￿ ect positive marginal product of labor. The neoclassical
model implies that development involves continuous increases in marginal productivity of
labor in both agricultural and industrial sectors so that their real wages rise continuously.
Hence, a distinctive turning point of accelerated wage growth does not exist.
Table 1 summarizes a set of changing labor market conditions during the development
process derived from the Lewis and neoclassical models. These predictions on wage growth
5Before the economy reaches the turning point, real wages might increase as a result of changes in the
institutional wage due to nonmarket forces (Reynolds, 1965) or improvement in agricultural productivity. In
this extended version of classical theory, the turning point signals the acceleration of real wage increase.
6Minami (1968) provides statistical tests showing that Japan reached the Lewis turning point between
1950￿ 1960.
7Table 1: Predictions of Labor Market Conditions: Classical vs. Neoclassical Models
MPL MPL Growth Wage Wage Growth
The Classical Lewis Model
Agriculture
Phase one MPLA
t = 0 0 wA
t = w￿ 0
Phase two 0 < MPLA
t ￿ w￿ positive wA
t = w￿ 0
Phase three MPLA





t = w 0 wM
t = w 0
Phase two MPLM
t > w positive wM
t = w￿q
y
t > w positive
Phase three MPLM
t > w positive wM
t = wA









t > 0 positive wM
t = MPLM
t positive
w￿ is the institutional wage measured in agricultural goods.
w is the institutional wage measured in manufacturing goods at initial terms of trade.
yqt is the terms of trade between agriculture and industry.
can be tested empirically using data from a developing economy.
2.4 Other Aspects of the Neoclassical Theory
A major contribution of Schultz￿ s Transforming Traditional Agriculture (1964) is his eloquent
criticism of the ￿zero marginal product￿ hypothesis. He shows that agricultural output
dropped signi￿cantly following heavy losses of rural manpower after the 1918￿ 1919 in￿ uenza
epidemics in India. Schultz argues forcefully that ￿there are comparatively few signi￿cant
ine¢ ciencies in the allocation of the factors of production in traditional agriculture.￿
The neoclassical framework stresses the role of individual choices and market equilibrating
forces. A number of studies have provided empirical evidence on the price responsiveness
of farmers in developing countries, which are shown to be consistent with the neoclassical
competitive framework. Hansen (1969) presents evidence that male adults by and large are
fully employed in rural Egypt once nonagricultural work is considered. Hansen also ￿nds
no evidence that wage level is governed by institutional factors. Instead, wages generally
appear to be highly ￿ exible and react to changes in demand. Hu⁄man (1980) argues that
farmers respond to changes in wage by reallocating labor between farm and nonfarm work.
Empirical analysis based on county-level data from the 1964 US Census of Agriculture ￿nds
wage elasticity of labor supply to be 0.34, well below the in￿nite wage elasticity predicted
8by the surplus labor hypothesis. Rosenzweig (1980) directly tests a neoclassical household
labor supply model using micro data from India. By extending the theory to consider
the di⁄erences in landholding status, Rosenzweig provides empirical evidence supportive
of the neoclassical-competitive labor supply model and inconsistent with the labor surplus
hypothesis. Since these early studies, a large body of literature has provided empirical
support to the neoclassical theory of economic development (e.g., Rosenzweig, 1988).
3 Empirical Analysis
Based on Table 1, we conclude that the classical and neoclassical theories have di⁄erent
views on the development of a dual economy. In particular, they imply di⁄erent patterns
of wage growth across rural and urban sectors. The classical model predicts three stages
of wage growth: an initial stagnation, followed by modest earnings increases in the urban
sector, and lastly nationwide accelerated wage growth. In contrast, the neoclassical theory
predicts continued wage growth across the two sectors during the development process.
In this section, we test the above mentioned implications of the two theories using multiple
sources of aggregate and individual data. After rejecting the Lewis hypothesis, we proceed to
examine whether the Chinese labor market data are consistent with other major implications
of the neoclassical model. We will explore the role of individual choices and market forces
in the determination of nonfarm work, rural-urban migration, interprovincial labor mobility,
and returns to education.
3.1 The Dual Economy and Labor Market Reforms in China
Before the inception of reforms in 1978, there were massive distortions in the allocation of
resources in China￿ s centrally planned system. The cumulative e⁄ects of pursuing a heavy
industry-oriented development strategy since the 1950s resulted in excessive allocation of
capital assets in urban areas and a high percentage of the labor force concentrated in the
countryside. The segregation of rural and urban sectors in China represents a typical dual
economy. Within the rural sector, national policies during central planning stressed agricul-
tural production and local grain self-su¢ ciency. Before the reforms, rural industrial activities
concentrated on a narrow range of products and remained subsidiary to agriculture. In 1978,
only about 7% of the rural labor force nationwide was in nonagricultural employment, gen-
erating approximately 7% of rural household earnings (Yang, 2004), a level far below that
of other comparable developing countries.
Market-oriented development in rural China started with a household responsibility sys-
9tem. This reform replaced production teams with households as units of basic production.
The change from communes to a household-based farm system induced strong family work
e⁄ort, thus reducing the demand for workers in small Chinese farms. Therefore, farmers
not only had incentives but also certain freedom in relocating labor to nonfarm uses. The
catalyst for the rapid expansion of nonfarm production was a series of policies that loosened
the restrictions on labor mobility and the operation of rural enterprises (Yang, 2004). By
the mid-1980s, households were conscious of their alternative opportunities; and they had
incentives to allocate resources quickly, including their labor, to nonagricultural activities
that would generate higher returns than those from farming.
Prior to the recent tide of out-migration from agriculture, rural and urban labor markets
were isolated in China for decades. Such segregation was mainly implemented through a
Household Registration System (HRS; hukou system). HRS imposed strong restrictions on
individuals in changing the location of their permanent residence. A rural worker would
have serious di¢ culties in living in an urban area without an urban hukou because employ-
ment and the allocation of housing, food, and other necessities were all contingent on urban
registration. Although rural reforms created the potential to release millions of rural work-
ers from the agricultural sector, rural-to-urban migration was tightly controlled until the
mid-1980s. Since then, the government permitted and then promoted rural nonagricultural
activities, creating rural nonfarm jobs as a prelude to large scale rural-to-urban migration.
Since the late 1980s, the growth of employment in rural nonfarm activities has slowed down
signi￿cantly (Fleisher and Yang, 2008). Subsequently, a change in the residential registra-
tion law in 1988 made it easier for migrants to acquire legal temporary residence in urban
areas. Beginning in the late 1980s, the demand for rural labor in urban areas continued to
increase due to the development of urban private and informal sectors; thus, national and
local authorities began to loosen restrictions on rural-to-urban migration (e.g. Fleisher and
Yang, 2008; Cai et al., 2008). As a result, the number of rural migrant workers in urban
areas began to increase dramatically. As labor mobility restrictions were lifted, rural house-
holds responsively allocated their labor among farm work, rural nonagricultural activities,
and urban jobs to maximize earnings.
3.2 Earnings Growth in Rural and Urban Sectors
Evidence from Aggregate Statistics
Major labor market reforms in China have taken place along with profound socioeconomic
transformations, including massive privatization, industrial structural changes, and regional
development since the inception of reforms in 1978. China￿ s wage structures have evolved
10accordingly, exhibiting major changes over the past three decades. In this section, we ￿rst
provide a summary of the trends in average earnings for rural and urban individuals for the
1978￿ 2008 period using published aggregate statistics.
Ideally, we would like to trace wage changes over time for comparable rural and urban
workers. However, published aggregate statistics from the SYC only report labor earnings
for sta⁄ and workers (zhigong), which are ￿formal employment￿ in the urban area.7 By
de￿nition, sta⁄ and workers do not include individuals employed in informal urban units,
where rural migrant workers are heavily concentrated. Therefore, the labor earnings of sta⁄
and workers would match poorly with the wages of rural migrants. Although SYC reports
per capita income from wages and salaries for rural households, converting this variable
to a wage measure for rural workers is di¢ cult. There are even more serious challenge in
distinguishing the wages of workers of township and village enterprises (TVEs) from those
of nonfarm self-employed or farm workers. Therefore, we can hardly construct comparable
wage measures for workers across the two sectors from published aggregate statistics.
Nevertheless, SYC publishes per capita disposable income for rural and urban households.
It is a comparable earnings variable across the two sectors, and presumably income growth
is highly correlated with wage growth. Figure 1 presents the real per capita income series for
the 1978￿ 2008 period with all nominal incomes de￿ ated by sector-speci￿c CPI.8 Our main
interest is on earnings growth over time; thus, we construct and plot income indices in the
￿gure, setting the value of income in 1978 to 100 in each sector.
Between 1978 and 2008, average real per capita income of urban households grew more
than sevenfold; similarly, that of rural households increased by about sixfold, as shown in
Figure 1. The data reveal a striking feature: rural and urban earnings increased continuously
and rapidly in lockstep throughout the 30￿ year period. This pattern rejects the applicability
of the Lewis turning point to this time period in China because the hypothesis predicts
the stagnation of rural wage growth in the ￿rst and second phases of development, followed
by sharp wage increases in the third phrase. There is no clear evidence that China has
7Sta⁄ and workers comprise all laborers receiving payments and being employed by (a) state-owned
units, (b) urban collectively owned units, (c) joint operation units, (d) limited liability companies and stock
companies, (e) foreign-owned units, (f) units with investment from persons in Hong Kong, Macao, or Taiwan,
or (g) units subordinate to one or more of the above units. Hence, the term sta⁄and workers exclude persons
(a) employed in township and village enterprises, (b) working in individual/private enterprises, (c) urban
self-employed persons, (d) retirees, (e) re-employed retirees, (f) teachers working in informal schools, (g)
foreigners and persons from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan who work in urban units, and (h) other persons
not to be included by relevant regulations.
8Disposable income of urban households is reported as the sum of wages and salaries, incomes from
properties, net business earnings, and transfers from other household members minus income taxes and
personal contributions to social security. Net income of rural households refers to the total income of
wages and salaries, household operations, transfers, and property earnings minus taxes and fees, household
operation expenses, depreciation of ￿xed assets for production, and gifts to relatives.
11experienced a long period of wage stagnation since the end of 1970s. Instead, the evidence
supports the neoclassical predictions of coordinated and continued wage growth across rural
and urban sectors during development. One driving force behind the synchronized income
growth is the rapid expansion of rural to urban migration. Sheng (2008) estimates that the
number of rural migrants increased from 8 million in 1985 to more than 120 million in 2005.
Without this massive migration ￿ ow, there could be serious misalignment in the average
wage growth of the two sectors.9










































Per Capita Annual Disposable Income of Urban Households
Per Capita Annual Net Income of Rural Households
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook, various years.
Income growth has been a⁄ected by macroeconomic environments and the progress of
institutional reforms. The two indices of earnings growth re￿ ect three distinctive phases of
reforms. In the late 1970s, major economic reforms, such as the Household Responsibility
System, were ￿rst introduced in the rural sector, resulting in rapid increases in farmers￿
earnings. Between 1978 and 1985, rural per capital real income increased at an annual rate
of 12.7%, surpassing the rate of 7.0% in the urban sector, because major urban reforms did
not start until 1985.10 In the 1986￿ 1997 period, rural reforms slowed down along with its
9Admittedly, there has been large and persistent rural-urban income disparity in China due to the con-
tinuation of urban-biased institutions and policies from the central planning period (Yang, 1999). However,
many barriers to labor mobility have been removed during the reform era.
10During this period, the urban-rural per capita income ratio was reduced from 2.9 to 2.0, the lowest level
in the past three decades.
12earnings growth, declining to an annual rate of 4.2%. During the same period, employment
in private and jointly-owned units experienced vigorous growth in the urban area, although
total urban income growth was still at a modest rate of 5.7%, which was partly in￿ uenced by
the two consecutive years of negative growth in 1988 and 1989 because of high in￿ ation and
political upheaval. In 1998￿ 2008, earnings growth accelerated in both sectors, reaching 5.9%
and 9.1% in rural and urban areas, respectively. This period of rapid income growth has
coincided with China￿ s preparation for and accession into the WTO, major restructuring
of SOEs that began in 1998, government direct subsidies to farmers, and the removal of
agricultural taxes in recent years.
Two caveats concerning the limitation of aggregate data are in order. First, per capita
income includes not only wages and salaries but also incomes from business, properties, and
transfers. Therefore, it is the average income for the population, not a direct measure of
labor earnings or payment to labor services. Second, aggregate data do not have information
on individual characteristics. The educational attainment of workers may be distributed
unevenly across rural and urban areas; thus, direct tests of the Lewis and neoclassical theories
should focus on the wage changes of workers with low education across sectors and over time.
Evidence from Micro Data
We use the CHNS as the primary source of microeconomic data to analyze the changes in real
wages over time. The survey was conducted by an international team of researchers whose
backgrounds include nutrition, public health, economics, sociology, Chinese studies, and
demography. The survey covers nine provinces: Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Shandong,
Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, and Guizhou. A multistage, random cluster process was
used to draw the samples surveyed in each of the provinces, covering both rural and urban
areas. For the rural sample, counties in the nine provinces were strati￿ed by income (i.e.,
low, middle, and high), and a weighted sampling scheme was used to select four counties in
each province randomly. For the urban sample, the provincial capital and a lower income
city were selected. Villages and townships within the counties and urban and suburban
neighborhoods within the cities were selected randomly. There are about 4,400 households
in the overall survey, covering about 19,000 individuals. The ￿rst round of the CHNS was
collected in 1989, and six additional panels were collected in 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004,
and 2006. This paper uses data from the CHNS longitudinal master ￿les covering all survey
years. Liaoning was not able to participate the survey in 1997, and Heilongjiang was only
added to the survey in 1997. To keep our empirical analysis comparable over time, we exclude
Liaoning and Heilongjiang and restrict our sample to the remaining seven provinces.
Throughout the paper, we focus on wages for adult workers engaged in wage employment.
13Table 2: Sample Statistics from CHNS, 1989-2006
Year N Earnings % Male Age Years of % Middle % High % College
(2007 yuan) School school school
Urban sites
1989 1260 3843 55.6 34.9 8.3 63.6 29.6 6.8
1991 1164 3963 54.9 35.1 9.0 60.1 32.6 7.4
1993 993 5100 55.3 36.2 9.2 58.7 33.0 8.3
1997 1071 6676 54.4 37.7 9.7 50.3 38.6 11.1
2000 916 9707 56.1 38.3 10.2 41.8 43.7 14.5
2004 665 13600 57.3 40.0 10.9 35.2 46.0 18.8
2006 678 17094 58.8 40.7 11.2 34.2 42.2 23.6
Rural sites
1989 1267 3782 62.3 33.5 7.8 74.7 23.0 2.3
1991 1153 3529 61.7 33.7 8.5 72.1 25.5 2.4
1993 1082 4148 63.0 34.1 8.7 69.9 27.7 2.4
1997 1111 5987 61.5 34.4 8.9 66.9 29.5 3.6
2000 1049 8870 62.3 34.3 9.4 60.0 33.5 6.6
2004 615 10777 63.7 38.2 10.0 51.9 40.7 7.5
2006 710 13310 62.5 39.6 10.2 49.0 39.2 11.8
Annual wage income is computed as months worked times average monthly non-retirement
wage, plus bonuses and other cash or in-kind income. We de￿ ate annual wages to 2007 by
province-speci￿c consumption price indices. Our sample for analysis includes all workers
aged 16￿ 55 for females and 16￿ 60 for males, excluding employers, self-employed individuals,
independent operator (including farmers), students, and workers whose real annual wages
were below one half of the real minimum wage.11 Finally, we exclude individuals with invalid
data on educational attainment. Applying the above selection criteria yields 13,734 workers
engaged in wage employment for the seven survey years. Among these workers, 6,747 (49.1
percent) are from urban sites (14 cities), and 6,987 (50.9 percent) are from rural sites (28
counties).
Table 2 presents summary statistics on wage and worker characteristics for each wave of
the CHNS surveys. The top panel describes sample statistics for workers from the urban
sites, the bottom panel denotes the workers from the rural sites. Table 2 reveals three
noticeable trends. First, workers from urban sites earn higher wages than those from rural
sites. The urban-rural wage di⁄erential increased from 2% to 28% in 1989￿ 2006. However,
the rural-urban wage disparity is much lower than the per capita income gap observed from
the aggregate data. This partly re￿ ects the fact that rural agricultural workers still earn a
11Provincial-level minimum wage is collected from the provincial or municipal Ministry of Human Resources
and Social Security. The minimum wage restriction has little e⁄ect on the sample average wage.
14much lower income than rural non-agricultural workers in wage employment.
Second, the trends in urban and rural wage growth based on CHNS data correspond
closely to patterns of per capita income growth in Figure 1 based on aggregate data. In both
rural and urban regions, real wage barely changed from 1989 to 1991 because of contractional
macroeconomic policies and high in￿ ation. Between 1991 and 2006, real wages grew con-
tinuously at an annual rate of 10.2% and 9.3% in urban and rural sites, respectively. From
household data, we do not observe wage stagnation in either urban or rural area, at least
since the late 1980s. Again, evidence appears to reject the existence of the Lewis turning
point.
Finally, Table 2 reports di⁄erences in individual characteristics among wage earners across
rural and urban sites. Workers from rural sites have a higher percentage of males; they
are slightly younger and less educated than their urban counterparts. While educational
attainment increased over time for all workers, urban workers continued to have an advantage.
In particular, the di⁄erence in average education between rural and urban workers was 0.5
year in 1989, but the gap increased to 1 year in 2006. In 2006, 49% of workers from rural
sites had an education level of middle school and below, which was 14.8 percentage points
higher than those from urban sites. In contrast, 23.6% of urban workers had at least some
college education, whereas only 11.8% of rural workers had the same schooling. These
observed schooling di⁄erences are likely to be a main source of the observed rural-urban
wage di⁄erential.
Figure 2 presents the relative wages and wage growth for di⁄erent groups of workers.
The real wages in 1989 are standardized to 100. We plot the patterns of wage growth for
all workers and for those with middle-school education and below for both urban and rural
samples. As the ￿gure shows, wages for all workers increased substantially at a rate greater
than that of workers with middle-school education and below, indicating growing returns to
education during this time period. Although wage growth for the less educated workers is
below that of the full sample (7.4% vs. 9.2% in urban sites and 6.6% vs. 7.7% in rural sites),
their wages have grown continuously since the early 1990s, evidence inconsistent with the
Lewis model.
During the process of out-migration from agriculture, rural individuals can choose among
rural farm work, rural nonfarm work, and labor migration to cities. Although nonfarm work
and migration yield a monetary premium, they also involve psychological and transportation
costs (Zhao, 1999). One unique feature of the CHNS data is that the survey not only
samples households from rural and urban sites but also records the status of each individual￿ s
household registration (hukou) beginning 1993. Using information on household registration,
we can classify workers into three categories: rural workers employed in nonfarm activities,
15rural migrant workers approximated by those working in urban sites with rural registration,
and urban workers with urban registration.12 Table 3 compares the wages of three types of
workers with middle-school education or below and presents their wage growth by setting
the 1993 wage levels as 100.























All workers from urban sites All workers from rural sites
Middle school and below workers from urban sites Middle school and below workers from rural sites
Sources:  China Health and Nutrition Survey, various years.
Table 3 establishes a clear trend that the real wages of rural nonfarm workers, rural mi-
grant workers, and urban workers with limited education all experienced continuous growth
in the 1993￿ 2006 period. These facts are inconsistent with the Lewis model of stagnant wage
growth followed by sharp rises in earnings. After 2000, wage growth of rural migrant workers
had outpaced that of rural nonfarm workers. This is consistent with the ￿ndings of Zhao
(1999): due to rising migration cost, rural workers may choose rural nonfarm jobs over mi-
gration even at signi￿cantly lower wages. Since 2000, average wages of rural migrant workers
are below those of comparable urban workers, but t-tests show that the two wage levels are
not statistically di⁄erent. This ￿nding may seem surprising because the earnings of urban
residents are known to be higher than those of rural migrants in urban China (Meng and
Zhang, 2001). However, a recent study by DØmurger et al. (2009) adopts a careful decom-
position analysis and ￿nds that the di⁄erences in observed characteristics between the two
12In CHNS, urban sites include both city neighborhoods and suburban villages, whereas rural sites include
township and rural villages. Since we exclude owner-employers and self-employed operators (including farm-
ers) from the sample, workers in rural sites with rural registration are most likely working in township and
village enterprises or rural private enterprises. Workers in urban sites with rural registration can be rural
migrant workers or workers from local suburban villages, which we do not attempt to separate.
16Table 3: Real Wages of Di⁄erent Groups of Low-Skilled Workers
Rural Nonfarm Workers￿ Rural Migrant Workers Urban Workers
Wage Growth Wage Growth Wage Growth
1993 4244 100.0 5131 100.0 4521 100.0
(2578) (3953) (4253)
1997 5971 140.7 6140 119.7 6038 133.6
(3432) (4612) (5233)
2000 8193 193.0 7254 141.4 8578 189.7
(6608) (4048) (9033)
2004 8375 197.3 9923 193.4 11259 249.0
(9450) (13264) (11608)
2006 10208 240.5 11200 218.3 13555 299.8
(6412) (7324) (17889)
￿ All wages are measured in 2007 yuan. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
groups of workers have the strongest e⁄ect on their earnings di⁄erences. Table 3 suggests
that the wages of rural migrant workers are competitive to the wages of urban unskilled
workers with similar characteristics and that these two groups of workers appear to be close
substitutes in the urban labor market. These ￿ndings lend support to the neoclassical view
of competitive forces in the Chinese labor market.
3.3 Migration and Labor Market Development
Rural Labor Markets and Rural-Urban Migration
During the centrally planned regime, labor mobility was restricted by the household registra-
tion system and a food rationing system. Beginning in the late 1970s, regulations governing
occupational choice and internal migration were gradually relaxed. In the early 1980s, the
government began to encourage farmers to leave agricultural production. A major policy
reform took place in 1988, when the control over labor ￿ ows was o¢ cially relaxed (Yang and
Zhou, 1999). Farmers were allowed to move to cities if they could provide their own staples
and were ￿nancially capable of running a business. On the supply side, the adoption of the
household responsibility system gave rural households the freedom of allocating productive
resources, including labor. On the demand side, the development of TVEs and urban private
and informal sectors increased the demand for rural labor.
Consistent with the neoclassical theory of rational behavior, farm households reacted to
these policy changes in a responsive manner. Starting in the mid-1980s, a large number
of rural workers began to seek employment in rural o⁄-farm work. Figure 3 shows the
employment shares of rural agricultural workers, workers in TVEs, and workers in rural
17private and individual enterprises. In the late 1970s, more than 90% of rural employment
was engaged in agricultural work. The proportion of rural workers in agriculture started
its long-term decline in 1984 when the government encouraged farmers to leave agricultural
production and work in nearby small towns. By 2008, the percentage of rural employment
in agriculture already dropped below 60%. The share of TVE workers rose from 10% in 1978
to more than 30% in 2008. Today, more than 10% of rural workers are employed in rural
private and individual enterprises, an ownership form that was nonexistent in the early years
of reform.
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Sources: China Statistical Yearbook, various years.
After the deregulation on rural-urban migration in the late 1980s, the size of rural mi-
grants in cities increased rapidly. Rozelle et al. (2009) estimated that 154 million rural
individuals worked o⁄-farm in 1995, including 54 million long-term migrants. Migration has
become the most prevalent form of labor supply to o⁄-farm activities since the late 1990s.
Rural to urban migration has exploded in recent years. Sheng (2008) estimates that the
number of migrants reached more than 120 million in 2005. The expansion of rural o⁄-farm
work and rural-urban migration has played a critical role in facilitating the integration of
rural and urban labor markets in China.
Aside from the documentation on the growing number of o⁄-farm workers and rural
migrants, there are also extensive micro evidence on farmers￿optimal choices among agri-
cultural work, local nonfarm work, and migration. Between 1984 and 1987, the total grain
18output in China stagnated after a period of enormous growth. This was attributable to
the exodus of agricultural labor to rural industrial activities, evidence indicating positive
marginal product of labor in the agricultural sector even in the very early years of reform
(Lin, 1992). As corroborative evidence, Yang (2004) ￿nds that farm households quickly
reallocated labor and capital from agricultural to nonagricultural activities once mobility
controls were relaxed. Moreover, Yang (1997) and De Brauw et al. (2002), among others,
show that education facilitates farmers to participate in nonfarm work and migration. These
￿ndings are consistent with the neoclassical view of optimizing individuals and the existence
of market equilibrating forces.
Interprovincial Migration
Another aspect of the neoclassical framework of development emphasizes individual migra-
tion behavior in the context of spacial equilibrium. For instance, Todaro (1969) highlights
the importance of rural-urban ￿expected￿income di⁄erential, that is the sectoral income gap
adjusted for urban unemployment, as a major factor in￿ uencing migration decision. Econo-
metric results from Zhu (2002) show that rural-urban income gaps signi￿cantly in￿ uence
individual mobility decisions in China. Persistent income gaps exist not only across rural
and urban areas, but also among geographic regions. In 2005, for example, the national
average wage of sta⁄and workers was 18,364 yuan; the highest level was observed in Shang-
hai at 34,345 yuan, whereas the lowest was in Jiangxi at 13,688 yuan. With a competitive
and well-functioning labor market in the US, Topel (1986) ￿nds that migration ￿ ows are
responsive to regional conditions. Kennan and Walker (2009) develop and estimate a model
of optimal sequence of migration decisions and ￿nd that interstate migration choices are
substantially in￿ uenced by alternative income prospects. We are interested in examining
whether similar market forces are at work in China.
Using provincial level data, we test the responsiveness of migration decisions to expected
earnings di⁄erentials and unemployment rates across Chinese regions. The hypothesis is that
inward migration ￿ ows respond positively to expected earnings in the destination province
and negatively to unemployment rates in that location. The responsiveness of labor mobility
to market conditions is an important indicator of a well-functioning labor market.
Provincial migration ￿ ows in this study are drawn from Duan et al. (2008). Their data
are compiled from the 1990 and 2000 censuses and the 1987 and 2005 1% population sur-
veys. Inward migration ￿ ow to each province is measured as a percentage of national total
migration. To capture regional di⁄erences in expected earnings, we collect data on average
wages of sta⁄ and workers and urban unemployment rate in each province from various vol-
umes of SYCs and Labor Statistical Yearbooks. Table 4 presents the sample statistics of our
19Table 4: Sample Statistics of the Province Panel
Migration (M) Average Wage (E) Unemployment Rate (U)
(%) (Yuan) (%)
1987 3.6 1,488 2.2
(2.2) (197) (1.2)
1990 3.5 2,163 2.8
(2.4) (315) (1.3)
2000 3.5 9,399 3.1
(3.7) (2,930) (0.7)
2005 3.5 18,131 3.9
(4.2) (5,613) (0.7)
Standard deviations are in the parentheses.
provincial panel. We use data from 28 provinces for 4 years; Chongqin, Hainan, and Tibet
are excluded from the sample because of missing observations.
We estimate the following migration equation:
Mit = ￿0 + ￿1Eit + ￿2Uit + uit; (1)
where Mit denotes the share of in￿ ow migration in province i in year t; Eit is the average wage
in the province measured in 10,000 yuan, Uit represents the urban unemployment rate, and
uit is an error term associated with idiosyncratic shocks in the local labor market. Column
(1) of Table 5 reports the OLS estimates of Equation (1). Consistent with the hypothesis
that individuals make migration decisions to maximize expected earnings, the provinces with
higher wages and lower unemployment rate attract more migrants. Both of the estimated
coe¢ cients are statistically signi￿cant.
There are large di⁄erences in the cost of living across Chinese provinces that may a⁄ect
migration decisions. As Brandt and Holz (2006) argue, regular provincial CPI indices only
allow a comparison of consumer prices over time but not a comparison of absolute price
levels between di⁄erent provinces at a point in time. We use their spatial price indices to
de￿ ate nominal earnings and construct provincial real earnings (REit) with adjustments to
local cost of living based on a basket of urban commodities 13. In regression (2), with the
replacement of nominal earnings by real earnings, we ￿nd similar positive e⁄ect of wage and
negative e⁄ect of unemployment on migration in￿ ows at the provincial level.
Migration ￿ ows may a⁄ect labor supply and therefore in￿ uence concurrent wages and
unemployment rate in the local labor market. To mitigate this potential endogeneity, we
13We use the estimates of current cost of urban basket from Brandt and Holz (2006)￿ s online appendix.
These price indices are available for 1984￿ 2004. We use the indices in 2004 as proxies for 2005.
20Table 5: Impact of Expected Earnings on Migration
Explanatory Dependent variable = Migration shares Mit
variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Eit 1.131￿￿ 0.439￿
(0.423) (0.269)








Constant 5.436￿￿ 5.083￿￿ 5.086￿￿ 4.222￿￿
(0.789) (0.815) (0.760) (0.537)
Adjusted R2 0.097 0.076 0.085 0.113
Sample size 112 112 112 112
Note￿ The ￿gures in parentheses are standard errors.
￿￿Signi￿cant at the 5% level. ￿Signi￿cant at the 10% level.
replace current period wage and unemployment rate by those from the previous year in
regression (3). Before their move, potential migrants form expectations about their future
earnings based on observed local market conditions in potential destinations in the previous
year. Their migration can a⁄ect the destination￿ s labor market conditions after the moving
decision has materialized but is not simultaneously determined with past conditions. Es-
timates of regression (3) show that migration has similar responses to current and lagged
unemployment and wages.
The simple speci￿cation of Equation (1) has potentially left out other determinants of
migration. These omitted variables, such as certain provincial characteristics, may a⁄ect mi-
gration ￿ ows, wages, and unemployment simultaneously. For instance, policy or geographic
advantages of a coastal province may attract more migration in￿ ows and result in high wages
and low unemployment. With limited information on these variables but with the aim of
controling for possible omitted variable bias, we run a ￿xed-e⁄ects regression and report
the results in column (4) of Table 5. Although the magnitude of the coe¢ cients is smaller
than the other speci￿cations, the signs of the key estimates remain and are still statistically
signi￿cant.
These regression results suggest that the e⁄ect of expected earnings and unemployment on
migration is robust to alternative speci￿cations. The high level of earnings of a destination
attracts inward migration, and a high rate of local unemployment discourages potential
21movers. Similar empirical results were found for the US economy where labor markets
usually operate e¢ ciently (e.g. Topel, 1986). Validating these results for China is encouraging
because serious labor market distortions are believed to exist in the 1987-2005 period. These
￿ndings suggest that rational individual choices and market forces were already behind the
integration of regional labor markets in China.
Returns to Education
Trends in monetary returns to education provide another criterion for evaluating the func-
tionality of a labor market. Human capital theory postulates that investments in education
have an e⁄ect in raising worker productivity, and this claim has been supported by strong
empirical evidence worldwide. However, in a labor market with policy interventions and in-
stitutional distortions, schooling may not be properly rewarded. Estimates of average returns
to education for China are typically around 4%￿ 5% in the late 1980s and early 1990s for both
rural (e.g., Yang, 1997) and urban regions (e.g., Meng and Zhang, 2001), much lower than the
average schooling returns of about 10%￿ 11% found in the rest of the world (Psacharopoulos,
1994). Therefore, the changes in returns to education can serve as a barometer to gauge the
progress of reforms towards a competitive labor market.
Since the mid-1980s, major wage and employment reforms have taken place in urban
China (Zhang et al., 2005). However, studies using data from the late 1980s and early 1990s
continue to ￿nd a low rate of return to education. Among other studies, Meng and Kidd
(1997) report the rates of returns to education at 2.5% and 2.7% in 1981 and 1987 among
workers employed in state-owned enterprises, respectively. Maurer-Fazio (1999) ￿nds 2.9%
and 4.5% of returns for male and female workers in 1988, and these returns rose to 3.7% and
4.9% in 1992, respectively. Yang (2005) shows that average rates of returns to education
across a sample of cities increased from 3.1% to 5.1% between 1988 and 1995. Using the
UHS data, Zhang et al. (2005) document continued increases in schooling returns in urban
China from 4% in 1988 to 10.2% in 2001. For rural households, Li et al. (2005) reports rising
returns to education in the years 1988, 1992, 1996, and 2002 based on a rural sample in
northern Jiangsu. Similarly, Zhang et al. (2008) ￿nds that the rate of returns to education
rose to 7% for a national representative rural sample in 2004.
To examine how market rewards to education have evolved with reforms, we update the
estimates of schooling returns to recent years and compare the estimates with those from
the mature US labor market in the same time period. The data for China come from 20
consecutive years of the UHS conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics from 1988
through 2007. The UHS data record basic conditions of urban households and detailed in-
formation on employment, wages, and demographic characteristics of all household members
22in each calendar year. Our data are from six provinces, namely, Beijing, Liaoning, Zhejiang,
Sichuan, Guangdong, and Shaanxi, which are representative of China￿ s regional variations.
We focus on annual wages for adult workers engaged in wage employment. Wage income
consists of basic wage, bonus, subsidies, and other labor-related earnings from a regular job.
Our sample includes all workers aged 16￿ 55 for females and 16￿ 60 for males, excluding em-
ployers, self-employed individuals, farm workers, retirees, students, and those re-employed
after retirement. Consistent with standard labor market studies, we exclude workers whose
real annual wages are below one￿ half of the real minimum wage to assure that workers in
the sample have full labor market engagements. In total, our data cover 250,006 individuals
in the period of 1988￿ 2007. In the 1988￿ 1991 period, annual sample size is about 3,000
individuals, whereas the sample size increases to about 8,500 in 1992￿ 2001, and rises further
to about 25,500 individuals per year since 2002.
We estimate a standard Mincer-type earnings equation for each year:
lnwi = ￿o + ￿sSi + ￿1Xi + ￿2X
2
i + ￿3Gi + Ri￿t + "i; (2)
where wi is annual wage earnings of individual i, Si is the years of schooling, Xi is the
years of potential experience measured as min (age - Si - 6, age - 16), and the quadratic
experience term X2
i allows for a concave lifetime wage pro￿le. The variable Gi denotes a
dummy variable for male, and Ri is a set of provincial dummy variables. Ideally, we would
use hourly wages in the regression, but work hours are not reported in the UHS data before
2002. From this speci￿cation, the schooling coe¢ cient ￿s provides an estimate for the rate
of returns to education.
Figure 4 plots year-speci￿c OLS estimates of the rates of returns to education in urban
China.14 The rate of return to one additional year of schooling increases from 3.6% in 1988
to 11.4% in 2007. Whereas the schooling coe¢ cient rises continuously until 2004, it stabilizes
to around 11% since then. These results extend the empirical ￿ndings of Zhang et al. (2005)
to recent years.
To compare the market value of schooling in China with that of a mature labor market,
we estimate the same Mincer earnings function for the US during the same period. The US
data come from 20 consecutive years of March Current Population Survey (CPS) conducted
by the US Census Bureau, which is a monthly survey of about 60,000 households. It con-
tains detailed information on employment, earnings, and demographics of all members of
households. We apply the same sample restrictions as those for the Chinese data. The total
number of individuals are 2,150,908 in the period of 1988-2007. The annual sample size is
14Detailed results of the regressions for all variables, including their standard errors and other statistics,
are available from the authors.
23about 92,000 individuals in the 1988￿ 2000 period, whereas the number increases to about
136,000 in 2001.
































China: coefficient estimates from UHS
US: coefficient estimates from CPS
We estimate Equation (2) for each of the years using the US CPS data and plot the
estimated coe¢ cients of schooling returns along with the estimates for China in Figure 4.15
Two striking patterns emerge from Figure 4. First, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the
rate of returns to education in China was just above one-third of the level found in the
US. Second, whereas the returns to schooling in both economies experienced upward trends
during the 20-year period, the growth was much faster in China. By 2004, the rate of returns
to education in China had already converged to the US level, and the two series ￿ uctuated
together just above 11% thereafter. The US is used as a benchmark because its labor market
is known to have few distortions.16 The rising returns to education in urban China and their
convergence to the US level can be interpreted as evidence that the pricing of human capital
has already approached the international norm. These ￿ndings suggest much improved labor
market situations in recent years relative to the distorted wage determinations in the late
1980s.
15Additional variables of worker characteristics, such as race, marital status, party membership, and union
status, can be added to the earnings regression. However, because these variables are not always comparable
across the Chinese and the US samples, we adopt the very basic speci￿cation of the human capital earnings
function.
16The underlying logics of this comparison is similar to that of Hsieh and Klenow (2009) who uses the US
as a benchmark for studying the extent of input market distortions in China and India.
244 Conclusions
Recent reports on labor shortages and rising wages of unskilled workers have caused public
concerns over whether China can maintain its global labor advantage in manufacturing
production and international trade. Applying the classical Lewis model of development,
several existing studies have found accelerated wage growth for rural migrants in recent years,
suggesting the arrival of the Lewis turning point. These studies anticipate that continued
industrialization and economic growth will lead to even higher rate of wage growth in China.
In this paper, we have cast doubts on the applicability of the Lewis model for analyzing
labor market developments in China. As such, we have laid out the basic ingredients of
the neoclassical theory of development as an alternative framework. The implications of the
two models on wage growth are derived and tested using multiple sources of data. We ￿nd
that altough migrant wages have indeed increased fast in recent years, they are consistent
with high GDP growth after China￿ s entry into the WTO. There is no systematic evidence
of institutional wage setting or zero marginal product of labor in rural China in the past
three decades. Empirical evidence based on both aggregate and household data fails to sup-
port the arrival of the Lewis turning point in China, showing continuous and coordinated
wage growth across rural and urban sectors during the post-reform era instead. Supporting
the neoclassical view, we ￿nd that rural workers expanded o⁄-farm work in a responsive
manner, interprovincial migration reacted to expected earnings and local employment con-
ditions, and the rates of returns to education converged to the international norm found in
competitive labor markets. These ￿ndings suggest that the Chinese labor market has been
responsive to changes in the demand and supply conditions and has become more e¢ cient
in the determination of wages.17
Despite major progress, institutional impediments to a well functioning labor market
in China still remain. Household registration (hukou) and social security systems are two
well-recognized areas that need re￿nements and further reforms. The lack of urban welfare
and social security provisions, especially among informal employment of rural migrants, is
an important piece of the puzzle behind the reported labor shortages and rising wages of
unskilled labor along coastal regions. General improvements in living and working conditions
in the countryside have also contributed to the observed outcomes. With the repeal of
agricultural taxes, the removal of school tuitions and fees in poor rural regions and job
17In a related paper (Ge and Yang, 2010), we investigate wage growth and rising wage inequality in urban
China for the 1992-2007 period, and ￿nd evidence that standard market forces, such as capital accumulation,
export expansion and skill-biased technological change, are the main determinants of wages during the period
of rapid globalization and transition.
25creations in the hinterland, plus the rising housing prices and other living costs in cities,
wages must rise to attract rural migrants to stay in urban regions away from their homes.
However, these market forces do not necessarily imply that wages in China will escalate
at a much higher pace relative to the wage growth in the past several years, as the huge
pool of labor will serve as a stabilizing force. As part of market responses, labor-intensive
production may continue to relocate to inland regions where labor costs are much lower.
Therefore, because China￿ s manufacturing wage is still about 7%￿ 10% of Korea and Japan
and 18%￿ 21% of Taiwan and Hong Kong (Yang et al., 2010), we believe that China will
likely maintain its global labor advantage in the foreseeable future.
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